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Abstract
In the context of EDEMOI -a French national project that proposed the use of semiformal and
formal methods to infer the consistency and robustness of aeronautical regulations through the analysis
of faithfully representative models- a methodology had been suggested (and applied) to different
(safety and security-related) aeronautical regulations. This paper summarizes the preliminary results
of this experience by stating which were the methodology’s expected benefits, from a scientific point
of view, and which are its useful benefits, from a regulatory body’s point of view.
1 Introduction
In order to safeguard civil aviation against accidental events (which is the concern of aviation safety) and
against intentionally detrimental acts (which is the concern of aviation security), governments worldwide
have imposed regulatory requirements upon the different aviation participants or, as they will be refer to
in this paper, entity-classes1.
Under the vigilant eyes of regulatory bodies, safety/security requirements are imposed on the entity-
classes in order to (1) prevent the body of causes that may directly or indirectly lead these entity-classes
into a hazardous operating/behavioral state, and/or (2) mitigate the consequences associated to such
states.
However, in order to be effectual, the regulatory requirements need to be robust, consistent and
pertinent. Indeed, their robustness ensures that the requirements exhaustively cover all the safety/security
relevant scenarios within the regulation’s domain of competence, or purview. Their consistency ensures
that they will not be mutually contradictory or incompatible. And their pertinency ensures that they are
relevant to enhancing aviation safety/security. Yet these three qualities can only be achieved through a
complete understanding of the regulatory domain, and of the concerned (or participating) entity-classes,
including their mutual interactions.
For this reason, regulatory bodies seek to fully identify all of the safety/security-concerned entity-
classes that exist within their purview, including their relevant (universe of) states2. This information,
along with their extensive practical and theoretical expertise, enables the regulatory bodies to adequately
determine the preventative or mitigative measures that they should impose onto the entity-classes, in
order to reduce their associated safety/security risks.
1This paper uses the term entity-classes to refer globally to the types of aviation participants upon which the regulatory
requirement are imposed. The nature of these participants can range from the persons involved in civil aviation operations,
to the objects that they use and the infrastructures that they employ. Some examples of an entity-class are: PASSENGER,
FLIGHT CREW MEMBER, AIRCRAFT, AIRPORT, COCKPIT.
2An entity-class’ relevant universe of state is the grouping of all of its pertinent possible states. In other words, the
grouping of all the states with: (a) a direct or indirect effect on the overall safety and/or security level and (b) a possibility
of occurrence greater than zero. An example of a pertinent and possible state for the FLIGHT CREW MEMBER entity-class
is the incapacitated state. Indeed, safety regulations have identified that the in-flight pilot incapacitation scenario is a remote
(4.5x10-7 per flight hour) but possible scenario with consequential impacts on safety. Therefore, regulators ensure that this
scenario is taken into account by their regulations
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This way, but rather unwittingly, regulatory bodies created a composite, abstract and subjective de-
scription of their purview, corresponding to their Conceptual View of the Real World. This conceptual
view is in fact implicitly found within their regulations, and it affords them a manageable (although
approximate) model of their regulated domain that helps them better grasp their regulatory domain’s
structure, correlations and interactions. It also serves them as an arbitrarily well-defined categorization
that groups individual entities (e.g. passenger Alice and passenger Bob) into a uniquely defined sets
of entities (e.g. the entity-class PASSENGER), upon which the regulatory requirements can then be
affixed3. Indeed, through well-defined categorizations such as this one, the regulatory bodies can specif-
ically denote the sets/subsets of entity-classes that are concerned with a specific regulatory requirement.
This means that the regulator’s Conceptual View of the Real World is intimately tied to a regulation’s
innate quality because: what can be expected of a regulation whose regulator has a distorted view of the
Real World? Or, if this view is missing relevant elements and/or relations?
Therefore, the regulator’s Conceptual View of the Real World needs to be checked to ensure the
validity of its assumptions and statements, but also the robustness (comprehensiveness) of their concern.
The figure shown below (Figure 1) elucidates on the notion of the Conceptual View of the Real World
(Figure 1, ACV) and on how it influences the pragmatic aspects of the regulatory framework.
Expressed
in terms of
Regulation
Regulatory Body
Real World
Represents their view of`
Constrains 
Intended World
Conceptual View
of the Real World
Steer 
towards
ARR
ACV
AIW
RW
Shapes
Shapes
Regulatory Requirements
Figure 1: Conceptual Representation on the Operational description of the Regulatory Framework.
However, due to the (ever-growing) complexity of civil aviation and to its ever-changing state of
affairs -brought on by adjusting factors4- regulators often find themselves overwhelmed by the challenge
of continuously safeguarding such a dynamical and complexly interrelated industry.
Indeed, the process of ’developing/updating’ the regulations undeniably entails the need to define
and modify many of the fixed and context-dependent axioms and assumptions5 that are the basis for the
regulator’s Conceptual View. This can result in the possible invalidation of some previously valid axioms
and assumptions, as they change to reflect the new reality of the system.
3In accord with the principle that law must be general (i.e. impersonal).
4An adjusting factor is any operational, ideological and/or technological change whose introduction, into the civil aviation
system, obliges a change in the contemporary regulations to preserve the appropriate overall functioning of the system.
5The axioms and assumptions are, respectively, the necessary truths and the generalized results that serve as the basis for
the argumentation and/or inference of the regulatory requirements. They represent the Domain Knowledge shown in Figure 2
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The Conceptual View of the Real World is therefore a crucial element in understanding the regula-
tions, ensuring their pertinence and verifying their actuality. It is in this context that EDEMOI advocated
the use of semiformal and formal methods and tools, to enhance the analysis (and consequently improve
the inherent quality) of aeronautical safety and security regulations. In other words, EDEMOI sought to
design an employable methodology6 that would facilitate the assessment of regulatory requirements.
2 The Proposed Methodology
The underlying approach for the EDEMOI methodology was to determine the analogies that could be
made between the domains where ’Requirements Analysis and Design in Systems and Software engi-
neering’is successfully used, and ’civil aviation safety/security’. This was done with the objective of
identifying the methods and tools used for these domains, to determine if they could be successfully im-
plemented in the assessment of aviation safety/security requirements by way of a tailored methodology.
The EDEMOI methodology proposed enhancements to the rulemaking procedure currently used by
civil aviation authorities. These enhancements included the incorporation of simulation and counterex-
ample checking tools into the regulation’s already established validation phase. This, with the objective
of better ensuring the requirements’ innate quality without any fundamental changes to the established
rulemaking procedure.
The methodology is centered on a two-step approach (see Figure 2) involving two kinds of stake-
holders: the Aviation Authorities, which establish regulations concerning civil aviation safety/security,
and the Model Engineers, who translate these natural language documents into semiformal and formal
models.
Given that regulations are rarely built from scratch, the methodology focused on studying/comparing
the evolutions of existing regulations in search of possible regressions.
In the first step of this approach, a Model Engineer extracts the security goals and the imposed
requirements from the original regulatory texts, and translates them into a semiformal (graphical) model
that faithfully represents their structure and relations (while reducing the use of inherently ambiguous
terms). Indeed, this model embodies the Conceptual View of the Real World that is partly implicit in
the regulation (as discussed in Section 1). This Graphical Model, understandable by both kinds of
stakeholders, is later revised and validated by the Aviation Authority, giving way to the methodology’s
second step, in which the Model Engineer performs a systematic translation of the semiformal model to
produce a Formal Model that can be further analyzed.
This methodology was used in the formalization of various international and supranational aeronauti-
cal regulations7 [7], [3] with discerning purviews and objectives. This allowed us to test the methodology,
and conclude that it provides some interesting benefits. However, not all of them can be fully exploited
by the regulatory bodies. The following sections provides a brief overview of the useful advantages of
the methodology (Section 3) and of its shortcomings (Section 4).
6The EDEMOI methodology was not designed as a substitute for the practices currently employed in the assessment of
regulatory requirements. On the contrary, it was designed to complement existing safety/security managements tools. Indeed,
the traditional assessment methods such as the regulation’s preliminary impact assessments, as well as the open (or closed)
consultation periods before their enactment, are sufficiently effective in identifying the more common errors. However, and
this was the motivation behind the EDEMOI project, new assessment techniques can allow the detection of the more elusive
shortcomings and errors.
7Parts of the following regulations were formalized : ICAO’s Annex 17 (International Airport security), ICAO’s Annex
II (Rules of Air), Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002 (European Airport Security), Directive 2008/114/EC (Security of European
Critical Infrastructure) and Regulation (EC) No. 2096/2005 (regarding the provision of Air Navigation Services).
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Figure 2: The Methodology proposed relies on the use of semiformal and formal tools to analyze regu-
latory requirements and enhance their innate quality.
3 The Methodology’s useful benefits
3.1 Introduction
As was mentioned previously, aeronautical regulations are natural language documents that impose re-
quirements onto real world entity-classes through a tacit abstract view of these entity-classes and of their
environment. This was said to be the aviation authority’s Conceptual View of the Real World. Formally
specifying this Conceptual View yields a detailed documentation of its underlying assumptions and ax-
iomatic base. Furthermore this formal specification can be accomplished while preserving a relatively
high fidelity between the Conceptual View and the resulting models. Because, the Conceptual View is
already an abstract and simplified model of the real world. This frees up the model engineer from the
burden/responsibility of creating the models from zero.
Furthermore, formal tools can genuinely provide a sound basis for the comprehensive comparison
of the abstract view and the real world it is supposed to embody. This, in order to detect diverging
conceptions since a flawed view of the real world will suggest ineffectual or futile requirements. Also,
using formal tools can facilitate the detailed understanding and analysis of the regulations’ predicted
implementation.
Figure 3 shows a side-by-side qualitative summary that synthesizes our experience and feedback
with regards to the communicative aspects of semiformal and formal models for safety/security experts
working within regulatory bodies. These results are part of the Assessment of Legislative and Regulatory
Requirements for ATM Security (ALRRAS) project, a feasibility study into the use of computer science
methods and tools to improve the assessment of pan-European aeronautical requirements. The eight
criteria were selected based on the available literature [6], [4], [5], [2] and because practical knowledge
of aviation safety/security identified them as facilitators of a regulation’s quality.
With respect to these criteria, semiformal models (whose performance is shown in red diagonals)
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Figure 3: Graphical representation of a qualitative assessment of the communicative aspects of Aeronau-
tical Regulatory Documents. Also shown, how these aspects are influenced by the complementary use
of semiformal (in red diagonals) and formal models (in solid blue).
were found to be, overall, more consistent in their communicating capacities. Also, they have proven
to be an enhancement for laypersons in terms of complementing their understanding of the aeronautical
regulations.
Formal models, on the other hand (whose performance is shown in solid blue) stood out for their
preciseness, exactness and their protection against ambiguity. However, as the qualitative values in the
diagram need to be pondered for each modeling-type (to take into account the weight given to each
criterion by regulatory bodies), the formal model’s excellent protection against ambiguity was quickly
overshadowed by its very poor comprehensibility by both laypersons and aviation safety/security experts.
Understandably, regulatory bodies, being less familiar with formal notations, need to be extremely
cautious when validating/invalidating formal models, as they may be less able to detect specification
errors8. This is especially true for regulators with a background in legal-studies, as they have been less
exposed to such notations than their colleagues with an engineering background.
For this reason, the methodology foresaw the complementary use of semiformal and formal models
(see Figure 2). Indeed, the process called for a semiformal model to be built directly from the regulatory
text. This semiformal model was enriched with Object Constraint Language (OCL) expressions and -
8For the most part, regulators needed few instructions to be able to understand/interpret the semiformal notations
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after having been analyzed and not invalidated9 by the corresponding authority- used as the basis for a
formal model.
A direct consequence of this methodology is that it provides a common semantic/understanding of
the regulatory requirements that is (almost10) independent of any natural language. This is true for both
the semiformal and formal models.
Also -and this is a byproduct of any specification process- the methodology can help identify impre-
cision, ambiguities and inconsistencies within the regulatory requirements.
More explicitly, we can say that formally specifying a regulation affords us:
• The ability to check where there are some holes in the regulations (a situation which is of a partic-
ular importance for security regulations!), and
• The ability to detect whether any regulatory amendments will introduce safety/security regressions.
3.2 Benefits of using Semiformal Models
The benefits provided by the semiformal models were, among others:
• Developing a common and understandable abstraction of the regulated domain and the participat-
ing entity-classes.
• Making the regulator’s Conceptual View of the Real World explicit, enhancing the manipulation of
their regulatory requirements.
• Providing a deeper linkage (traceability) between the different elements that comprise the regula-
tory framework.
The mixed semiformal/formal approach was indeed necessary, as was justified in figure 3. Through
the use of UML-like notations, model engineers with a double competence in law and computer sciences
can create semiformal models of the regulation’s addressees. which convey their static (using class
diagrams) and dynamic (using state-transition diagrams) properties. The utility of these models is that
they can be used to represent, in a less ambiguous manner, how the regulatory requirements impact
the entity-classes’ structural and behavioral aspects. That is, the models can be used to show how the
regulations reshape their static and dynamic properties.
Also, static models provide a deeper traceability between the different entity-classes and regulatory
requirements. This allows a holistic view of normally separate (yet interrelated) regulations, and rec-
onciles their domain-oriented structuring with their class-entity oriented implementation (e.g. all rules
pertaining to the flight of an aircraft vs. all rules applicable to the FLIGHT CREW MEMBER entity-
class). All of this helps facilitate the impact analysis of adjusting factors, as well as the regression
analysis of the subsequent regulatory amendments.
Coupled with this, semiformal methods can help identify where the regulations are open for diverg-
ing interpretations. Moreover, these types of models can be used to create very rigorous specification
of certain aspects of the entity-classes, particularly the dynamic diagrams (such as a state-transition dia-
gram) where the use of guards can be very formal (more or less: IF ... THEN ... ELSE .. the presence of
ELSE being mandatory for completeness reasons!). The advantage of this type of model is that the gain
in formalism is not coupled with a loss in comprehensibility.
9When verifying the models, regulatory bodies are better positioned to detect errors within a specification -and therefore
to ’invalidate’ a model- rather than ’validating’ them as being free of errors.
10The final models keep only remnants of the original regulatory text, preserving entity-class names, attribute and states
descriptors.
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3.3 Benefits of using Formal Models
Among the benefits provided by the use of formal models we can mention:
• It allows the regulation’s meaning to be specified with more precision and exactness, helping
the model engineer identify the more tricky areas (i.e. where the regulation can be interpreted
differently).
• It affords the ability to automatically derive testing material.
Formal methods can be used to perform a comparative analysis between the Real World (Figure 1,
RW) and the legislator’s Conceptual View of the Real World (Figure 1, ACV). Using a formal models
and tools for this analysis entails two benefits. Firstly, the act of formally specifying both the Real
World and the regulator’s Conceptual View of the Real World can be a preliminary way of identifying
their differences/incongruities. Secondly, the formal specifications can be put through a comprehensive
comparative analysis that is not possible by other means.
Much like the semiformal models, formal models also help identify some areas where the regulation
may be interpreted differently, but since they allow the regulation’s meaning to be better specified, they
undoubtedly help the model engineer identify more clearly those areas where the regulation can be inter-
preted differently but also help them make sense of these tricky parts. Indeed, revisiting the semiformal
model after having developed the formal one allowed us to make significant improvements in the semi-
formal model, particularly in terms of simplifying the model, but also by helping identify specification
errors.
This was the case during the formal specification of a European airport security regulation, where a
subtle language lapse in one of its articles11 was discovered only after it had been formally specified. It
had gone undetected in the original regulation, its eleven different language translations, and in its first
semi-formal model. The article establishes the conditions (and limits) by which an airport can be labeled
as ’small’, and therefore be derogated from applying the stringent (and expensive) security standards
enforced at larger airports. But, as shown in figure 4, the original text version alleviated only a fraction
of the small airports it was supposed to exempt.* The original version of article 4.3.(a) was inconsistent with the stated hypothesis that “airports 
with a lower frequency of operations (usually) present a lower level of threat." 
“…airports with a yearly average of 
2 commercial flights per day…” day
flights
rageyearly ave  2=
* The original version of article 4.3.(a) was inconsistent with the stated hypothesis that “airports with a lower 
frequency of operations (usually) present a lower level of threat." 
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Figure 4: During the formal specification of Regulation (EC) 2320/2002, a subtle language lapse was
identified. Although this wording error did not have a negative effect in terms of security -as it made
the regulatory requirements more restrictive than originally intended-, it did have an economical impact
on those small airports that where technically considered as large. The figure above transcribes the
original regulatory requirement (on top) and its amended version (at the bottom). Also, the requirement
is represented in two additional ways. In the center, as a mathematical expression. At the far right, as a
one-dimensional graph.
11Regulation (EC) No. 2320/2002. Article 4.3.(a) Criteria for Small Airports
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It is undoubtedly clear that formalization helps regulatory bodies to better understand and check their
regulations from a technical point of view. But, what are the real uses and advantages that will result
from this methodology?
4 The Methodology’s shortcomings
As mentioned previously (Section 2), the methodology has both positive and negative aspects that need
to be weighed, in order to define its utility as a tool to enhance the analysis of aeronautical safety and
security regulations. This section will discuss its most consequential ’faults’ or shortcomings.
From the previous section (Section 3), it is undoubtedly clear that formalizing regulatory require-
ments helps (from a technical point of view) regulatory bodies better understand their regulations by
providing them with supplementary insight of their regulated domain and concerned entity-classes. How-
ever, it is not so clear from a practical standpoint.
Indeed lawyers are experts in law but they have a hard time understanding or, even more, developing
such formal models [8]. Therefore, there will always be a need for a model engineer to develop the
models. But, even when a model engineer develops a formal model of the regulations, the lawyers are
unable to directly validate it, as they have a hard time understanding the notation. This leaves little use
for such models. However there is a work-around to this problem. An alternative ’validation’ solution is
to animate/simulate the formal model in order to indirectly validate it. This indirect validation is done
by comparing the results of the scenarios animatied/simulated, with the expected results of their actual
implementation. The disparities between both results becoming the focus area for a detailed revision.
However, this alternative solution also entails many difficulties, as regulations are very abstract texts,
impossible to animate/simulate ’as is’. As shown in the following figure (Figure 5), regulatory texts need
to be complemented by various other sources in order to have a model capable of being animated/simu-
lated. Indeed, regulations need to be more or less stable through time -to ensure stakeholder’s awareness
of their obligations-, and the best way for ensuring this stability is for their regulatory requirements to
be written using broad and general statements. Nevertheless other non-mandatory documents such as
guidance material, industrial best practices, and standard procedures can help fill in the gaps between the
regulation’s abstract text and its detailed description, thereby enabling its animation/simulation.
For instance, the following regulatory requirement12 concisely imposes that each country shall screen
their originating passengers: 4.4.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that origi-
nating passengers of commercial air transport operations and their cabin baggage are screened prior to
boarding an aircraft departing from a security restricted area.
This text could lead to a very simple binary animation/simulation of the passenger screening which
would be interesting if this where the first time the regulation is being enacted, to test its basic logic.
However, since this requirement has been around since 1975, the requirement has to be complemented by
its associated guidance material and by integrating the domain knowledge and best practices, to produce
a more complete animation/simulation of the same process, and try to find the more elusive errors.
The fact that lawyers cannot easily understand formal models entails another problem. Since the
formal models cannot be directly validated by the regulatory bodies, there will never be a benchmark
formal specification of the Real World! Any model-to-model comparison (such as the one between the
Real World and the legislator’s Conceptual View of the Real World) will only provide a relative assertion
into their validity. In fact, since there is no single ’valid’ model to which others can be compared, all that
can be expected from a model-to-model comparison is a measure of compatibility among the compared
models, without any clear reference into which one of the discerning models is preferable.
12ICAO - Annex 17. Eighth Edition, 11th Amendment. Measures relating to passengers and their cabin baggage.
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Figure 5: Regulations are not comprehensive sources of information so their modeling will not be able
to produce an animatable/simulatable model. These models have to be completed through other sources
in order to produce a ’runnable’ model.
Nevertheless, one can look at the ’half-full’ part of the glass and say that: even though the compar-
isons will only be relative, the disparities/incongruities between the compared models will help legisla-
tors by giving them a focus area or some starting points for their conventional validation process. And,
in the end, this could lead to a more concrete and/or accelerated validation process (i.e. improve the
assertiveness and reactiveness of the process).
Finally, the methodology is necessarily a collaborative modeling process, as it requires the regulatory
body to validate the models produced by the model engineer. This can be done through a cross-reading of
the semiformal models. Unfortunately, this does nothing to improve the quality of the validation process
currently used13). This is because the validation process is still exposed to erroneous assessments -a
false appreciation of the model that leads it to be validated as a faithful representation of the regulations.
Nevertheless, an extensive traceability between the regulations and the produced models should strongly
limit this situation.
5 Conclusion
The regulator’s Conceptual View of the Real World is a crucial element for understanding the regulations,
ensuring their pertinence and verifying their actuality. As such, it needs to be made explicit and checked
to ensure the validity of its assumptions, of its statements and the robustness (comprehensiveness) of
their concern.
Through the formalization of various international and supranational aeronautical regulations we
have concluded that, in order to achieve this, it should be mandatory to integrate the use of semiformal
methods into the current rulemaking process! Indeed, as mentioned in Section 3.2, semiformal methods
13For more information concerning the current rulemaking process see [1]
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that have been enriched with OCL expressions allow regulatory bodies to ’master the complexity’ of
their regulations, by providing them with a comprehensible, structured and maintainable representation
of their Conceptual View of the Real World, where the entity-classes and regulatory requirements are
interlinked. This last point is very important as it promotes the holistic analysis/view of the regulations,
and facilitates their regression analysis in case of amendments.
Granted, formal methods could also contribute to the accomplishment of these improvements, how-
ever their low comprehensibility by regulators (see Figure 3) means that they can only be used ’behind
the scenes’, to help disambiguate the most tricky elements/parts of the regulations before presenting
them to the regulatory authorities via semiformal models. Otherwise, one must consider the costs asso-
ciated to (and the time consumed in) training regulators in the use/utilization of formal notations. These
costs, weighed against the foreseen benefits, have convinced us that, presently, this alternative is not a
worthwhile enterprise.
Nevertheless, if one decides to undertake this course, and adopt formal methods as the primary tool
for assessing civil aviation regulations, they should not undermine the importance of having the model
validated by the aviation authority. For this, they should opt for a validation process involving a third
trusted party. This party, external to the civil aviation authority and to the model engineers could be
composed of engineers with a double-competency in civil aviation regulations and in formal methods.
This double-competency would allow them to validate the formal models and help with the analysis of
the regulations.
References
[1] European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) Management Board. Decision of the Management Board
Amending and Replacing Decision 7-03 Concerning the Procedure to be Applied by the Agency for
the Issuing of Opinions, Certification Specifications and Guidance Material (’RULEMAKING PRO-
CEDURE’), 2007. http://www.easa.europa.eu/ws_prod/g/doc/About_EASA/Manag_Board/2007/
MBDecision08-2007amendingrulemakingprocedure.pdf.
[2] Asaf Degani. On the Design of Flight-Deck Procedures. Technical Report NASA Contract NCC2-327
and NCC2-581, Georgia Institute of Technology, 1994. http://ti.arc.nasa.gov/m/profile/adegani/
Flight-Deck_Procedures.pdf.
[3] Regine Laleau et al. Adopting a situational requirements engineering approach for the analysis of civil aviation
security standards. The Journal of Software Process: Improvement and Practice (S.P.I.P.), 11(5):487–503, July
2006. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/spip.291.
[4] Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). FAA Writing Standards. Order 1000.36. Federal Aviation Admin-
istration (FAA), 2003. http://www.faa.gov/documentlibrary/media/order/branding_writing/
order1000_36.pdf.
[5] United States Government Accountability Office (GAO). System Safety Approach Needs Further Integration
into FAAs Overisght of Airlines. United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), 2005. http:
//www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-726.
[6] Plain English Network (PEN). Writing User-Friendly Documents: A Handbook for FAA Drafters. Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), 2000.
[7] Eduardo Rafael Lo´pez Ruiz. Formal Specification of Security Regulations: The Modeling of European Civil
Aviation Security, 2006.
[8] Eduardo Rafael Lo´pez Ruiz and Be´atrice Trigeaud. La Mode´lisation Informatique des Re`gles de Droit Rel-
atives a` la Suˆrete´ du Transport Ae`rien International. Annuaire Franc¸ais de Droit International (A.F.D.I.),
53:672–696, 2007.
Proceedings of NFM 2010, April 13-15, 2010, Washington D.C., USA. 96
